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Empirical analyses of firms’ price-setting behavior show that while the
exchange rate pass-through of Japanese firms is low (many Japanese firms
adopt pricing-to-market [PTM]), the export prices charged by U.S. firms
nearly perfectly reflect foreign exchange rate fluctuations. This paper 
analyzes how the difference in domestic and foreign firms’ price-setting
behavior affects the domestic and international transmission of monetary
policy by using a model that explicitly incorporates differences in the price-
setting behavior of domestic and foreign firms. This model is constructed 
by adopting the framework of the “new open-economy macroeconomics” 
that has been the subject of numerous research papers in recent years. 
The findings demonstrate that the effects of domestic and foreign monetary
policies differ greatly when domestic and foreign firms adopt different 
price-setting behaviors. This indicates that central banks have to give 
sufficient attention to firms’ price-setting behavior for the implementation 
of monetary policies. 
Additionally, model simulations based on Japan and U.S. data show
that the external effect of Japanese monetary policy is negligible compared
with that of U.S. monetary policy due to the PTM price-setting behavior of
Japanese firms. 
Key words: New  open-economy macroeconomics; PPP (purchasing
power parity); PTM (pricing-to-market); Monetary policy;
Beggar-thy-neighbor effectI. Introduction
By the early 1990s, the Mundell-Fleming model has served as the main analytical
framework for international macroeconomics. However, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)
proposed their dynamic general equilibrium open-economy model (hereinafter
referred to as the “O-R model”) with monopolistic competition and sticky price.
Since then, the “new open-economy macroeconomics” has attracted the attention of
a great many researchers, and recently research has been conducted on extending
some aspects of the O-R model. This line of research includes numerous papers on
the effects of firms’ price-setting behavior.
1 Previously, the O-R model assumed that
the law of one price (LOP) always holds because firms set their export prices at 
the foreign-currency equivalents of their domestic sales prices, based on producers’
currency pricing (PCP). However, many researchers have amended this assumption
by explicitly incorporating firms’ pricing-to-market (PTM) price-setting behavior
into their models. These research efforts are generating useful findings regarding
exchange rate volatility and the international monetary policy transmission.
Nevertheless, the research to date attempting to incorporate PTM into “new
open-economy macroeconomics” has still room for improvement. For example, many
of the researchers such as Devereux and Engel (1998) assume that all domestic and
foreign firms adopt PTM for their price setting.
2 Under this extreme assumption, the
exchange rate pass-through on to export prices is zero for an entire nation, and the
depreciation of a nation’s currency from monetary easing improves the nation’s terms
of trade and worsens foreign countries’ terms of trade. However, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000) question the practical validity of the PTM model by noting that, in the real
world, the exchange rate pass-through is not zero and depreciation of a nation’s 
currency actually worsens its terms of trade.
As one approach to overcoming this problem, Otani (2001) proposes the intro-
duction of international asymmetric price-setting behavior. Specifically, the empirical
analyses on PTM conducted by Knetter (1993) and others show that Japanese firms
absorb approximately half of all exchange rate fluctuations by changing their markup
ratios,
3 while the exchange rate pass-through of U.S. firms is 100 percent (that is, 
virtually all U.S. firms adopt PCP). When this asymmetry in price-setting behavior
between U.S. and Japanese firms suggested by the empirical studies is introduced
into the model, depreciation of a given nation’s currency deteriorates its terms of
trade. Thus, this approach can overcome the empirical criticism made by Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000).
In this paper, we incorporate the asymmetric price-setting behavior of domestic
and foreign firms in the new open-economy macroeconomics model, based on the
approach presented in Otani (2001). Then we analyze the effect of asymmetric 
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1. These research efforts have not been confined to PTM. See Lane (2001), Sarno (2001), and Otani (2001) for 
surveys of other issues.
2. Exceptions include Betts and Devereux (2000), as discussed below.
3. From the macroeconomic perspective, the pass-through ratio is 50 percent for an entire nation either when the
pass-through ratios of all the firms in a country are 50 percent or when half of the firms adopt PTM and the other
half adopt PCP. Therefore, the simulation analysis in Section VI assumes that half of the Japanese firms set their
export prices based on PTM.price-setting behavior on exchange rate volatility and on the international monetary
policy transmission. This paper expands the model developed by Betts and Devereux
(2000), which assumes that a fraction s of both domestic and foreign firms adopt
PTM for their price setting. More specifically, the model in this paper assumes that a
fractions of domestic firms and a fraction s
* of foreign firms adopt PTM price-setting
(hereinafter, these are referred to as “PTM firms”). Under these assumptions, the
ratio of domestic and foreign firms that adopt PCP price-setting (hereinafter referred
to as “PCP firms”) becomes 1 – s and 1 – s
*, respectively. Thus, it becomes possible to
incorporate the asymmetry in price-setting behavior between domestic and foreign
firms into the model. 
The introduction of asymmetric price-setting behavior has several advantages.
First, it enables research consistent with the firms’ price-setting behavior based 
on available empirical evidences. Second, it demonstrates that the exchange rate 
pass-through is not zero and that depreciation of the home currency deteriorates the
home country’s terms of trade, overcoming the criticism by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000). Finally, the model includes both the O-R model (s = s
* = 0) and Betts and
Devereux (2000) (s = s
* > 0) as special cases. Thus, the model presented in this paper
well illustrates the extent to which the results of prior research are changed when the
domestic and foreign firms’ price-setting behaviors are different.
While the model examined in this paper is a slightly generalized model of 
Betts and Devereux (2000), to the best of my knowledge virtually no research to date
has explicitly incorporated firms’ asymmetric price-setting behavior into the new
open-economy macroeconomics framework.
One might wonder if the assumption of exogenously predetermined percentages
of PTM firms in the domestic and foreign countries might not be plausible under
changes in macroeconomic economic policies (see for example, Taylor [2000]).
4
However, the empirical evidences on exchange rate pass-through presented by Campa
and Goldberg (2001) show that it is not a stable macroeconomic environment 
but rather structural changes that have brought about the decline in exchange rate 
pass-through.
5 Since this paper analyzes a model without any structural changes, 
it may be reasonable to assume that firms’ price-setting behavior is exogenous and
constant, based on the conclusions reached in Campa and Goldberg (2001). 
Following this introduction, Section II explains the framework for the model
adopted herein. Section III incorporates price rigidity into the model and derives 
the equilibrium under price rigidity. Based on this, Section IV explicates how 
PTM influences the effect of monetary policy and Section V conducts welfare-based
analysis on the international monetary policy transmission. Section VI presents 
simulations based on Japanese and U.S. data, leading to various implications for the
3
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4. Taylor (2000) states that exchange rate pass-through is on a downward trend in recent years due to low worldwide
inflation rates and stable monetary policies. Devereux and Engel (2001) analyze Taylor’s conjecture using the
framework of new open-economy macroeconomics. They show that exporters generally set prices in the currency
of the economy with the most credible monetary policy. Therefore, firms in the country with a credible monetary
policy and low inflation rate adopt PCP, but firms in the country with a non-credible monetary policy and high 
inflation rate adopt PTM. 
5. Structural changes include the rise in the share of manufactured goods and the corresponding decline in that of
agricultural products, raw materials, and mineral fuels in world trade.implementation of Japanese monetary policy. Finally, Section VII summarizes 
the findings of this paper. Appendices 1 and 2 define the long-run and short-run
equilibria discussed in Section III. 
II. The Model Setup
The model is structured around those presented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995,
1996) and Betts and Devereux (2000). There are two countries: home and foreign.
Foreign country variables are denoted by an asterisk. Each country consists of the
household, firm, and government sectors. The households in both countries are con-
tinuously distributed within the range of zero and one, and consume differentiated
goods produced by firms of both countries. The home country household is continu-
ously distributed within the range of zero to n, and the foreign country household
within the range of n to one (where 0 < n < 1). Then, n and 1 –n also represent the
home and foreign country populations, respectively. Let index h denote household. 
Every household owns one distinctive firm that produces one differentiated 
good using only its labor. Let index j designate the good. We introduce the 
asymmetric price-setting behaviors by assuming that the percentage of PTM firms 
in the home country is s and that in the foreign country is s
*. The results using 
the model in this paper are consistent with Betts and Devereux (2000) in the case
when s = s














t +χ log —– – —(l
h
t )
2  . (1)
t=0  Pt 2       
Here, β expresses the discount ratio, subscript t denotes time, superscript h is the
index designated household, and C
h is the real consumption index, where c
h
t (j)
shows consumption of good j by household h, as detailed below:
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6. Betts and Devereux (2000) use the following utility function:
∞
 γ Mt
h 1–ε  U
h
t = ∑ β
t logC
h
t + —— (—–) + η log(1 – l
h
t)
t=0  1–ε Pt  , 
while this paper uses the utility function of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) just as it is, as shown in equation (1). This
is because the utility function of equation (1) is more easily solved and provides less complex solutions, and
because one of the purposes of this paper is to synthesize the open-economy macroeconomic model developed
herein based on PCP price-setting behavior (the O-R model) and the new research on incorporating PTM into
open-economy macroeconomics.
The difference in the findings when equation (1) is used rather than the utility function in Betts and Devereux
(2000) is essentially limited to the potential that the foreign exchange rate may overshoot depending upon the value
of ε (see Footnote 12), and has almost no influence on the international transmission effects of monetary policy.θ










θ dj  ,   θ > 1.  (2)

The price indexP, which corresponds to the real consumption index in equation (2)
in the sense thatP minimizes the nominal expenditure at any given real consumption





Pt =  ∫
1
0pt(j)
1–θ dj  , (3)

where pt(j) is the nominal price of good j, as explained in detail later. 
The term M
h
t/P in this utility function expresses the real money holding at the
beginning of period t + 1. Since an increase in money holding reduces transaction
costs, it increases utility. The final term in equation (1) represents the disutility from
labor input l
h
t, and κ of the coefficient of labor input is the positive parameter. 
2. Firms’ price-setting and price indices
PCP firms set their export prices at the foreign currency equivalent of their domestic
sales prices. PTM firms set their domestic sales prices in domestic currency and their
export prices in foreign currency, so they price-discriminate across countries.
Let pt(h) and qt(h) represent the home-currency and foreign-currency prices of 
a good made by domestic PTM firm h. The home-currency price of a domestic 
PCP firm’s good is also pt(h). This reflects the fact that, as shown in Section II.C, 
the home-currency prices of domestic PTM firms are always the same as those 
of domestic PCP firms. Moreover, the foreign-currency price (export price) of a
domestic PCP firm’s good is pt(h)/et, assuming that et is the nominal exchange rate





*) denote the home-currency and foreign-currency
prices of a good made by a foreign PTM firm h
*. Then, the foreign-currency price of
the foreign PCP firm’s good is qt
*(h
*) and its export price is etq t
*(h
*). 
Equation (3) can now be amended using these notations and the ratios of domestic
and foreign PTM firms, s and s
*. The domestic and foreign general price indices, 
P and P
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7. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) assume that all firms are PCP firms (s = s
* = 0). In this case, it is easy to show
that the domestic general price index, equation (4), and the foreign general price index, equation (5), lead to 
Pt =etPt
*, that is, purchasing power parity (PPP) always holds even if prices are rigid. In the model presented in this
paper, since PTM firms exist, PPP holds only when prices are flexible (see Section II.C and Section III.B), and
PPP does not hold when prices are rigid.Similarly, the home export price and import price indices Γ and  Γ
* (both 
denominated in the home currency) can be expressed as follows: 

—— 1
Γ t =  ∫ 0
ns
(etqt(h))























1–θ .   (7)

3. International bond markets
Households can trade one-period nominal discounted bonds denominated in the
home currency in a completely integrated international asset market. Foreign-
currency denominated bonds do not exist. Let Bt
h be the total value of nominal bonds
held by domestic households, which were issued at the end of period t – 1 to finance
the current account deficit in period t – 1 and mature in period t. And let Bt
h* express
the total value of bonds held by foreign households. If Bt
h or Bt
h* are negative, the 
figure becomes the outstanding balance of the bond issuance. Since the households in
the country with a current account deficit issue bonds and the households in the
other country hold all of them, nBt
h + (1 –n)Bt
h* = 0 always holds true.
In addition, let dt be the home-currency price of the bond that matures at 
period t. Then, dt is the inverse of one plus the nominal interest rate (the gross 
nominal interest rate) as follows:
1       dt = — —–,
1+  it
where it denotes the nominal interest rate between period t –1and t. Letting rt be the
real interest rate, the Fisher equation, 1 + it = (1 +rt)(Pt/Pt –1), holds between it and rt.
Since there is free trade between the countries in nominal bonds, uncovered interest
rate parity, 1 + it = (1 + it
*)(et/et–1), also holds between it and it
*. 
4. Household’s optimization behavior
The household h in the home country receives income from wages, wtlt
h, profits on
its ownership of domestic firm, π t
h, and transfers τ t
h from the government (negative 
figure indicates a lump-sum tax) at period t. It is assumed that the household holds
the total value of nominal bonds, Bt
h, and the nominal money balance M
h
t–1 from









h + π t
h – PtC t
h + Ptτ t
h.
The household maximizes its lifetime utility defined by equation (1) subject to
the above budget constraint to determine its consumption, labor, and money and
bond holdings as follows: 
C
h
t+1 = β (1 + rt+1)C
h
t,   (8)
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Equation (8) is the Euler equation, equation (9) is the real money demand function,
and equation (10) shows that the marginal disutility from additional one unit of labor
is equal to the marginal utility from consuming the added wage income. 
The optimization behavior of the foreign household can be analogously described.
B. Government
The government in each country conducts both monetary policy and fiscal policy. All
the seigniorage revenues are assumed to be rebated to its own citizens as transfers
(and possibly in the form of lump-sum taxes). Thus, the government’s per capita







t –1.  
The foreign government’s per capita budget constraint is defined analogously.
C. Enterprises
We assume that a home firm h’s production function is expressed as yt(h) = lt(h). 
The real consumption index defined as equation (2) leads to home household h’s









where v(j) denotes the home currency price of good j. v(j) is equal to either pt(j),
pt
*(j), or etqt
*(j), depending upon which category (domestic good, foreign PTM
good, or foreign PCP good) good j falls within. 
When the home firm is a PCP firm, it determines its employment and pt(h) to










t denotes the domestic PCP firm’s production level. 
Assuming that prices are flexible, given the demand function expressed in 
equation (11), the optimal price is determined as follows: 
θ pt(h) = —— wt. (12)
θ –1       
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cost (wt) multiplied by the markup ratio (θ /(θ – 1)). Note that the export price of
PCP firm h is pt(h)/et. 

















t express the home PTM firm’s production level for the domestic and
foreign markets, respectively.
8 Based on these same considerations, the sales price of
this PTM firm can be expressed as shown in equation (13), when prices are flexible.
θ pt(h) = etqt(h) = ——wt.   (13)
θ –1 
From equations (12) and (13), the sales price of a PTM firm is equal to that of a
PCP firm. Therefore, even if the domestic and foreign markets are segmented and
firms set their export prices in different currencies, LOP holds for every good as long
as prices are flexible.
III. Equilibrium under Price Rigidity
In this section, we introduce price rigidity to the model presented in the previous 
section following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996), to examine how equilibrium
is determined under price rigidity. 




*)) in the current
period (period t) are set one period in advance and do not change even if an unex-
pected shock occurs in the current period. Prices are adjusted in the following period
(period t + 1) to incorporate the effects of such shocks. The PCP firms change their
export prices in response to exchange rate changes even during period t, while PTM
firms’ export prices remain unchanged in period t. Therefore, the effect of exchange
rate changes on the general price level in period t can vary, depending on the ratio of
PTM firms. 
Households change their consumption schedule following changes in the general
price level and bond holdings even in period t. Since monopolistic firms can earn
more profit through increased sales even though their sales prices remain unchanged,
they will raise their production level to meet any additional increase in demand. 
In period t + 1, the long-run effect of goods price changes also emerges. 
We can define period t, when households and firms change their consumption
and production schedule given constant prices, as the short run, and period t + 1,
when prices are changed, as the long run. Since agents optimize their intertemporal
resource allocations, future changes in consumption and production influence 
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* denote its production level for the domestic and foreign market, respectively.current behavior. Therefore, to examine the short-run influence of shocks on the
economy, it is necessary to simultaneously consider their long-run influence as well. 
In this paper, we consider the effects of permanent expansionary monetary policy
as one example of such shocks. However, we can obtain a closed-form solution in 
this model only at the steady state where the nominal bond holdings are zero. So we
evaluate the effects of monetary policy by obtaining the rate of change from the 
initial steady state before the shock occurs. 
In this section, we first define the initial steady state where the nominal bond
holdings are zero and then clarify the relationship between monetary policy and 
equilibrium conditions in the short run and the long run. 
A. Initial Steady State
In the initial steady state, consumption and production are both constant without any
shock. It is assumed that the activities of individual agents can be represented by the
representative agent and are symmetric. Under this assumption, since the first-order
conditions for every household and firm are all the same, we drop superscript h in 
equations (8)–(10). Likewise, we can drop superscript h
* in the first-order conditions
for foreign households. Moreover, we do not need to distinguish each firm’s output,
since the export prices of PCP and PTM firms are identical. Hereafter in this paper,
overbars indicate a symmetric steady state.
From equation (8), the real interest rate in the steady state is determined by the
subjective discount rate as follows:
1– β r – = ——– ≡ δ .  
β
Moreover, the budget constraint of representative household as well as goods and
bond market equilibrium conditions lead to equations (14) and (15) held in the
steady state.
n(1 – d –)B – (1 –s)py –– + s(px –– + eqz —)   nC – = ———— — +n———————— —,   (14)






*)q –*y –* + s
*(—– x –* + q –*z –*) e –
(1 –n)C –*= ————— + (1 – n) ——————————— —. (15)
e –P –* P –*
The first terms of the right-hand sides of equations (14) and (15) express the interest
revenues from bond holdings (or interest payments), and the second terms indicate
the revenues from the production and sales of goods. Both terms are expressed in real
terms. In addition, the nominal bond price d – can be expressed as d – = β = 1/(1+ δ )
since the inflation rate is zero and the real interest rate equals the nominal interest
rate in the steady state. 
When prices are flexible, it can easily be shown that Pt = etPt
* holds between
domestic and foreign general price levels, by inserting LOP for individual goods and
9
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the steady state. 
Next, we consider the initial steady state, where the current account balances and
bond holdings are zero, in order to obtain a closed-form solution. Let zero subscripts
on the barred variables denote this steady state. 
In this steady state, B –
0 = 0 holds by definition, and the equilibrium is completely
symmetric across countries. It is straightforward to show the following closed-form
solution for labor input, consumption, and exchange rate holds.
1

















Hereafter, for any variable U, the rate of change from the initial steady state,U –
0,
can be expressed asU ˆ = (U –U –
0)/U –
0. By this method, we can examine the short-run
and long-run effect of monetary policy.
B. Long-Run Equilibrium
Suppose permanent monetary easing, M ˆ
t – M ˆ
t
* = M ˆ
t+1 – M ˆ *
t+1, is implemented in the
steady state examined above. The equilibrium in period t + 1 can then be expressed
by the following six conditions: (1) the Euler equation, (2) the money demand 
function, (3) the labor supply equation, (4) the balance of payments equation,
9
(5) the market clearing conditions for domestic and foreign goods,




Based on these conditions, the relationship between changes in money supply
(which are an exogenous variable) and changes in consumption, the current account
and the foreign exchange rate in period t + 1 can be expressed as shown in equations
(16) and (17). Appendix 1 shows the details regarding the derivation of these equations. 
e ˆt+1 = (M ˆ
t+1 –M ˆ *
t+1) – (C ˆ
t+1 – C ˆ*
t+1), (16)
δ (θ + 1)  —————— —B ˆ
t+1 = C ˆ
t+1 – C ˆ*
t+1. (17)
(1 –n)(1 + δ )2θ
The rate of change in each variable is evaluated based on its initial steady state
level. Note that the change in bond holdings from the initial steady state (B ˆ
t+1) is 
calculated based on the nominal consumption expenditure in the initial steady state
(P –
0C –
0), since the current account balances and B –
0 = 0 hold in the initial steady state. 
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9. The balance of payments equation indicates that the current account balance is equal to the difference between
the revenues and the expenditures.
10. In the long-run equilibrium, the market clearing conditions for PCP goods are identical to those for PTM goods,
since the export prices of PCP firms are equal to those of PTM firms.Equation (16) is the long-run money market equilibrium condition and shows
that when the domestic money supply increases faster than domestic consumption,
the general domestic price level has to rise and, thus, the domestic currency is 
depreciated. Equation (17) is the long-run goods market equilibrium condition. 
It indicates that a home country current account surplus in period t will raise 
home consumption relative to foreign consumption in the long run, since the 
current account surplus increases bonds holdings, and therefore, interest revenues 
in period t + 1. 
C. Short-Run Equilibrium
1. Short-run equilibrium conditions
Next we examine the equilibrium conditions in period t. It is assumed that firms 






*)) in response to 
an expansionary monetary policy shock, and that they passively change their 
production schedules in period t in response to the foreign exchange rate changes
resulting from the monetary shock. Additionally, households revise their consump-
tion schedule in period t responding to changes in PCP goods’ prices following 
the exchange rate fluctuations and increases in money holdings. Based on these
assumptions, the short-run equilibrium conditions are changed from the long-run
equilibrium conditions.
To begin with, equation (10), which is the labor supply equation, is no longer
valid because of price rigidity. Because PCP and PTM firms set different export
prices, market clearing conditions for both PCP goods and PTM goods become 
necessary. Additionally, PPP does not hold due to the existence of PTM firms, since
when the exchange rate changes after pt(h) and qt(h) were set one period ahead, pt(h)
is different from etqt(h) and LOP does not hold. Nevertheless, uncovered interest rate
parity still holds.
To summarize, the equilibrium conditions in period t are expressed by (1) the
Euler equation, (2) the real money demand function, (3) the balance of payments
equation, (4) the market clearing condition for PCP goods, (5) the market clearing
condition for PTM goods, and (6) uncovered interest rate parity. See Appendix 2 for
the details of these equations. 
2. Short-run money market equilibrium and goods market equilibrium
From the definition of general price indices, it is easy to show that 
P ˆ
t = (1–n)(1 – s
*)e ˆ t, (18)
P ˆ
t
* = –n(1 – s)e ˆ t. (19)
With sticky prices, the country’s general price level depends on the firms’ price-
setting behavior in the other country. That is, the response of the country’s general
price level to exchange rate change is lower, the higher the percentage of PTM 
firms in the other country. In the limit, if all foreign firms are PTM firms (s
* = 1),
domestic general price remains unchanged in the short run. Additionally the foreign
general price level does not change at all when all the domestic firms are PTM firms. 
11
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the home and foreign countries becomes equation (20). 
δ ——– (r ˆ t+1 – r ˆ
*
t+1) = –[ns+ (1 – n)s
*]e ˆ t. (20) 
1+δ
Equation (20) demonstrates that the home and foreign real interest rate differential
increases in proportion to the ratio of PTM firms (regardless of whether they are
domestic or foreign).
11
We can now derive the short-run relationship between money supply (which is 
a policy variable) and the model’s endogenous variables (changes in the foreign
exchange rate and consumption).
From equations (8) and (18)–(20), the short-run and long-run differentials
between the rates of change in domestic and foreign consumption can be expressed
by the rate of change in the exchange rate as in equation (21). 
C ˆ
t+1 – C ˆ *
t+1 = (C ˆ
t – C ˆ *
t ) – [ns+ (1 – n)s
*]e ˆ t. (21) 
This implies that the short-run and long-run differentials between the rates of
changes in domestic and foreign consumption are not identical as long as the 
percentage of PTM firms is not zero, because home and foreign real interest 
rates diverge.
Substituting equations (18)–(20) into the short-run equilibrium conditions, the
short-run money and goods markets equilibrium conditions can be expressed as
shown in equations (22) and (23). 
1          1      ([1 –ns – (1 –n)s
*] + —)e ˆ t – —e ˆ t+1 = (M ˆ
t – M ˆ *
t ) – (C ˆ
t –C ˆ *
t ), (22)
δδ
1     ————— –B ˆ
t+1 = (θ [1 – (1 – n)s –ns
*] + (s + s
* – 1))e ˆ t – (C ˆ
t –C ˆ*
t ).
(1 –n)(1 +δ )  
(23)
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11. The rates of changes in the domestic and foreign real interest rates can be derived as follows. From equations (9),
(18)–(20), and (27), r ˆt +1 and r ˆ
*
t +1, which denote the rate of changes in the domestic and foreign real interest rates
between t and t +1, can be expressed as
1+δ r ˆ t +1 = – ——–{C ˆW





t +1 = – —— –{C ˆW




t = nC ˆ
t + (1 – n)C ˆ *
t . In case of e ˆ t > 0, it is easily verified that r ˆ t+1 and r ˆ
*
t +1 are negative, but the foreign real
interest rate does not decline so much compared with the domestic real interest rate.D. Changes from the Initial Steady State
In this subsection, we examine how the endogenous variables are determined after the
permanent money supply changes M ˆ
t – M ˆ
t
* = M ˆ
t+1 – M ˆ *
t+1. Let the change in variable 
X all over the world be X ˆW = nX ˆ + (1 –n)X ˆ*. 
First, the money market equilibrium condition in both the short run and the long
run, equation (24), is derived from equations (16), (21), and (22). 
[1 –ns – (1 –n)s
*]e ˆ t = (M ˆ
t – M ˆ
t
*) – (C ˆ
t – C ˆ
t
*). (24)
Additionally, from equations (17), (21), and (23), the goods market equilibrium 
condition both in the short run and the long run can be expressed as follows: 
[2θ + δ (θ + 1)](C ˆ
t –C ˆ
t
*)        e ˆt = ————————————————————————— —.
δ (θ
2 – 1) + 2θ [ns + (1 – n)s
*] – δ (θ + 1)(θ [(1 – n)s +ns






* from equations (24) and (25), the exchange rate change can then
be expressed by the rates of changes in the money supplies as follows: 
[2θ + δ (θ + 1)](M ˆ
t –M ˆ
t
*)                         e ˆ t = ———————————————— .  (26) 
δθ (θ +1) + 2θ –δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*]
From equations (22) and (24), we find e ˆ t = e ˆ t+1.
12 Note that Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995, 1996) show that the exchange rate does not overshoot but rather immediately
jumps to the long-term equilibrium level in response to the money supply changes.
The above results also demonstrate that there is no overshooting of the exchange rate
in our model. 
Second, the changes in world consumption, C ˆW, can be derived as follows from
equations (8), (9), (18), and (19):
C ˆW
t = M ˆ W
t –n(1 –n)(s –s
*)e ˆ t. (27) 
The change in domestic consumption in period t can be shown as follows from 
equations (22) and (27), and e ˆ t = e ˆ t+1:
C ˆ
t = M ˆ
t – (1 – n)(1 –s
*)e ˆ t. (28)
To derive this equation, we use the relationships C ˆ
t =C ˆW
t + (1 – n)(C ˆ
t – C ˆ *




t –C ˆ *
t ).
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12. Betts and Devereux (2000) use the utility function presented in Footnote 6, and show that the exchange rate
overshoots when ε > 1. When ε = 1, they find that the exchange rate does not overshoot.Then, by substituting equation (26) into equation (28), the change in domestic
consumption can be expressed by the changes in domestic and foreign money 
supplies as follows:
13
 (1 –n)(1 – s
*)[2θ + δ (θ + 1)]           C ˆ
t =  1 – ———————————————— – M ˆ
t
 δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 – n)s +ns
*]
(29)
(1 –n)(1 – s
*)[2θ + δ (θ + 1)]  + ——————————————— — –M ˆ *
t . 
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*]
Noting that θ > 1, the coefficients of M ˆ
t and M ˆ *
t in the above equation are both 
positive (whens
*=1, then the coefficient of M ˆ *
t is zero). Therefore, equation (29) shows
that either domestic or foreign monetary easing increases domestic consumption.
14
Third, let us examine how domestic and foreign monetary easing influences
domestic production. Because there are domestic and foreign PTM and PCP firms in
this model, the aggregate domestic production (Y ) is defined as s(x + z) + (1 – s)y, 
and the aggregate foreign production (Y
*) is defined as s
*(x
* + z
*) + (1 – s
*)y
*. 
As with the rate of change in domestic consumption, the rate of change in domestic
production (Y ˆ
t) is equal to Y ˆW
t + (1 –n)(Y ˆ
t – Y ˆ *
t ).
The rate of change in world production is equal to that in world consumption in
equation (23). The differential between the rate of changes in domestic and foreign
production can be derived as follows from the market clearing conditions for PTM
goods and PCP goods:
15
Y ˆ
t –Y ˆ *
t = θ [1 – (1 –n)s –ns
*]e ˆ t. 
Domestic production can then be expressed by the rates of changes in domestic
and foreign money supplies as equation (30) utilizing the above equation.
16
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13. Similarly, the change in foreign consumption can be expressed by the domestic and foreign money supply
changes by the following equation:
n(1 –s)[2θ + δ (θ + 1)]                         n(1 –s)[2θ + δ (θ + 1)]            C ˆ*
t = ——————————————— —–M ˆ
t +  1 – ———————————————– —  M ˆ *
t . 
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*]           δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*] 
14. When s + s
*<1, the reason for this result is as follows. First, when expansionary monetary policy is implemented
in the home country, the terms of trade of the home country deteriorate through home currency depreciation.
On the other hand, since the production increases in response to the improvement in domestic firms’ competi-
tiveness and money holding by domestic households increases, the real income of domestic households increases.
In addition, the domestic real interest rate falls. Therefore, domestic consumption increases through domestic
monetary easing. Next, when the foreign country implements monetary easing, the terms of trade of the home
country improve through the appreciation of the home currency and the domestic real interest rate falls.
Therefore, domestic consumption also increases under this case.
15. The differential between the rate of changes in home and foreign production expresses the substitution effect
between home and foreign goods of exchange rate changes. This can be easily shown from equations (6) and (7).
16. Similarly, the change in foreign production can be expressed as follows by the rates of changes in the domestic
and foreign money supplies: 
–2θ (θ – 1)[1 – (1 –n)s –ns
*] + [2θ + δ (θ + 1)]s
*
Y ˆ *
t =n —————————————————— –—–M ˆ
t
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 – n)s +ns
*]  
 2θ (θ – 1)[1 – (1 –n)s –ns
*] – [2θ + δ (θ + 1)]s
*  + 1 + n —————————————————— — –  M ˆ *
t . 
 δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 – n)s +ns
*]      2θ (θ – 1)[1 – (1 – n)s –ns
*] – [2θ + δ (θ + 1)]s  Y ˆ
t = 1 + (1 –n)—————————————————— — M ˆ
t
 δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*]    
(30)
–2θ (θ – 1)[1 – (1 – n)s –ns
*] + [2θ + δ (θ + 1)]s + (1 –n)—————————————————— —–M ˆ *
t . 
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*]   
Simple calculations show that the coefficient of M ˆ
t is positive, and that the 
coefficient of M ˆ *
t is either positive or negative depending on the values of s and s
*.
Consequently, while domestic monetary easing always increases domestic production,
foreign monetary easing may either increase or decrease domestic production.
17
Finally, the domestic current account balance in period t is equal to the total
amount of fund-raising by bond issuance in period t, dt+1Bt+1. The change in the 
current account balance can be expressed as β B ˆ
t+1 by log-linearizing dt+1Bt+1, and β B ˆ
t+1
is shown as equation (31) by substituting equations (24) and (26) into equation (23). 
(1 –n)2θ (θ – 1)[1 – (1 – n)s –ns
*]   β B ˆ
t+1 = ———————————————— –(M ˆ
t – M ˆ *
t ). (31)
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ – δ (θ
2 –1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*]
The coefficient of M ˆ
t –  M ˆ
t
* in equation (31) is positive, so domestic monetary 
easing causes a current account surplus in the home country, while foreign monetary
easing causes a current account deficit in the home country.
18
IV. PTM and the International Monetary Policy Transmission
We now consider in details how PTM influences the effect of monetary policy on
endogenous variables defined in the previous section.
A. Effects on Exchange Rate Changes
In the previous section, we show that there is no overshooting of exchange rate in this
model. Then, in this subsection, we move on to other characteristics of exchange rate
changes, that is, the relationship between PTM and the exchange rate changes shown
in equation (26).
Betts and Devereux (2000) incorporate PTM price-setting behavior into the O-R
model, but they assume domestic and foreign firms’ price-setting behaviors are 
symmetric (s =s
* >0). They show that the rate of depreciation increases from domestic
15
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17. The reason of this conclusion is as follows. First, when expansionary monetary policy is implemented in the
home country, the domestic production increases since the depreciation of home currency improves the com-
petitiveness of domestic firms and the domestic monetary easing boosts consumption in the home and foreign
countries. Next, when monetary easing is implemented in the foreign country, the home currency appreciation
hurts the competitiveness of domestic firms. On the other hand, world demand expands. Therefore, whether the
domestic production increases or decreases depends on the degree of deterioration in competitiveness and the
degree of the increase in world consumption. 
18. When expansionary monetary policy is implemented in the home country, home income increases in the 
short run. This causes the current account surplus in the home country, since the home country increases its 
consumption by less than the increase in income for intertemporal consumption smoothing. Conversely, foreign
monetary easing brings about the current account deficit in the home country.monetary easing when the percentages of domestic and foreign PTM firms rise at the
same tempo. However, in the model presented in this paper, there is no need to assume
that the PTM firm ratios rise with s =s
*. From the denominator of the right-hand side
of equation (26), even if s and s
* rise at a different tempo, the rate of depreciation
increases from domestic monetary easing. That is, equation (26) generalizes the 
characteristics of the exchange rate changes shown by Betts and Devereux (2000).
The main contribution of this paper that incorporates asymmetric price-setting
behavior is to show that the rate of depreciation is not only dependent on the firms’
price-setting behavior but also on the economic scales of the home and foreign coun-
tries. To consider this point, differentiating the exchange rate changes from the money
supply changes with respect to the economic scale of the home country, n, we derive
the following equation:
d(∂ e ˆt/∂ (M ˆ
t – M ˆ
t
*))             (s
* – s)[2θ + δ (θ +1)]δ (θ
2 – 1)   ——————— — = ——————————————— —–.  (32)
dn (δθ (θ +1)+2 θ – δ (θ
2– 1)[(1 – n)s +ns
*])
2
The denominator of the right-hand side and the coefficient of s – s
* on the numerator
of equation (32) are respectively positive. Therefore, it is clear that the relationship
between the exchange rate changes from permanent money supply changes and the
economic scale of the home country, n, depends on the relative size of s and s
*. 
Imposing  s = s
* on the right-hand side of equation (32) following Betts and
Devereux (2000), the change in n does not influence the exchange rate changes from
the permanent money supply changes. However, when s > s
*, the exchange rate
changes from the permanent money supply changes increase when n approaches
zero.
19 One intuitive explanation regarding this point is as follows. 
Domestic currency depreciation usually causes a shift in demand from foreign
goods to home goods. However, since the percentage of domestic PTM firms is lower
than that of foreign PTM firms, this effect is weak. Under these circumstances, when
n declines, the number of domestic goods to which demand shifts from foreign
goods becomes lower, making it difficult for the demand to shift from foreign goods
to domestic goods in accordance with the reduction in n. Therefore, for exchange
rate changes to have a given effect on the real economy, the rate of depreciation must
be far greater as n declines.
This result implies that when firms in a small country set their export prices based
on the large country’s currency under the floating exchange rate regime, the influence
of a certain level of monetary easing or tightening on the exchange rate changes
increases as the size of the small country decreases. The framework of this model is
limited in that the country size and the PTM firm ratios are exogenous. Nevertheless,
this result implies that the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates is likely 
to be emphasized in the small country when it uses the large country’s currency as 
its settlement currency, as in the case of trade between the U.S. and East 
Asian economies.
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19. Similarly, when s < s
*, the exchange rate changes from the permanent money supply changes decrease as n
approaches one.B. Effects on Consumption
Equation (29) shows that the effect of monetary policy on consumption depends on
the value of s and s
*. This relationship can be summarized as follows. 
First, the positive effect of domestic monetary easing on consumption weakens 
as s rises, while it conversely strengthens as s
* rises. Let us explain the reason why s
and s
* exert opposite effects on consumption. When s is high, the exchange rate
change does not affect the foreign currency-denominated export prices of domestic
goods so much and its effect in shifting world demand from foreign goods toward
domestic goods weakens. Moreover, the higher s is, the less the rate of increase of 
foreign consumption is (see equation [27]). All of these effects lower the rates of
increase in exports, real income, and ultimately in consumption in the home country.
On the contrary, when s
* is high, regardless of the depreciation of the home currency,
the import prices cease to rise and the terms of trade do not deteriorate by much in
the home country, making monetary easing directly increase domestic real income.
As a result, the rate of increase in domestic consumption is raised by an increase in s
*.
In particular, when all the foreign firms are PTM firms (s
* = 1), domestic monetary
easing exerts a great influence on domestic consumption but foreign monetary easing




Second, similarly, when the monetary easing is implemented in the foreign 
country, the rate of increase in domestic consumption rises with higher s and it falls
with higher s
*. See Table 1 for these effects of PTM on consumption. 
17
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Table 1  PTM Effect for the Influence of Monetary Policy on Consumption
Domestic monetary easing Foreign monetary easing
Domestic consumption Positive Positive (including 0)
(Ct)( ∂ C ˆ
t / ∂ M ˆ
t > 0) (∂ C ˆ
t / ∂ M ˆ * t ≥ 0)
Effect of an 
Decline in rate of increase Acceleration in rate of increase
increase in s
Effect of an Acceleration in rate of increase Decline in rate of increase
increase in s* (in case of s*= 1, C ˆ
t = M ˆ
t) (in case of s*= 1, C ˆ
t = 0)
Foreign consumption Positive (including 0) Positive
(Ct*) (∂ C ˆ * t / ∂ M ˆ
t ≥ 0) (∂ C ˆ * t / ∂ M ˆ * t > 0)
Effect of an Decline in rate of increase Acceleration in rate of increase
increase in s (in case of s = 1, C ˆ * t = 0) (in case of s = 1, C ˆ * t = M ˆ * t )
Effect of an
Acceleration in rate of increase Decline in rate of increase
increase in s*
C. Effects on Production 
From equation (30), the positive effect from domestic monetary easing on domestic
production diminishes and that from foreign monetary easing on domestic produc-
tion strengthens (or the negative impact weakens) with a rise in both s and s
*. The
reason is that an increase in the PTM firm ratios (regardless of whether they are
domestic or foreign) reduces the response of local currency-denominated export
prices to exchange rate changes, leading to a weaker demand shift between domestic
goods and foreign goods (it lowers the substitution effect). In the special case whereall the domestic and foreign firms are PTM firms (where s = s
* = 1), both nations’
export prices remained unchanged regardless of exchange rate changes, so production
in both nations expands by the same amount in line with the expansion in world
consumption.
20 Table 2 shows this relationship.
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Table 2  PTM Effect for the Influence of Monetary Policy on Production
Domestic monetary easing Foreign monetary easing
Domestic production Positive Positive or negative
(Yt)( ∂ Y ˆ
t / ∂ M ˆ
t > 0) (∂ Y ˆ
t / ∂ M ˆ * t > 0 or < 0)
Effect of an
Acceleration in rate of
increase in s
Decline in rate of increase increase (or decline in
rate of decrease)
Effect of an
Acceleration in rate of 
increase in s*
Decline in rate of increase increase (or decline in 
rate of decrease)
Foreign production Positive or negative Positive
(Yt*) (∂ Y ˆ
t*/ ∂ M ˆ
t > 0 or < 0) (∂ Y ˆ
t*/ ∂ M ˆ * t > 0)
Effect of an Acceleration in rate of increase 
Decline in rate of increase
increase in s (or decline in rate of decrease)
Effect of an  Acceleration in rate of increase
Decline in rate of increase
increase in s* (or decline in rate of decrease)
D. Effects on the Changes in Current Account Balance 
As in the cases of consumption and production, equation (31) reveals that the 
effect of monetary easing on current account balances can also change depending 
on s and s
*. As the PTM firm ratio rises (regardless of whether firms are domestic or
foreign), the domestic current account surplus by domestic monetary easing and 
the domestic current account deficit by foreign monetary easing diminish. Table 3
summarizes this relationship. 
The intuitive reasons behind these results can be explained using the case where
the monetary easing is implemented in the home country. First, as s rises, the rates 
20. This result is clarified by the following equations: 
Y ˆ
t = nM ˆ
t + (1 –n)M ˆ *
t = M ˆ W
t , 
Y ˆ *
t = nM ˆ
t + (1 –n)M ˆ *
t = M ˆ W
t . 
These equations are derived by substituting s = s
* = 1 into the change in domestic production in equation (30)
and the change in foreign production shown in Footnote 16.
Table 3  PTM Effect for the Influence of Monetary Policy on the Current Account
Balance
Domestic monetary easing Foreign monetary easing
Home country current   Surplus (in case of s = s*= 1,  Deficit (in case of s = s*= 1,
account balance it can balance) it can balance)
(dt+1Bt+1)( ∂ β B ˆ
t+1 / ∂ M ˆ
t ≥ 0) (∂ β B ˆ
t+1 / ∂ M ˆ * t ≤ 0)
Effect of an
Decline in surplus Decline in deficit
increase in s
Effect of an
Decline in surplus Decline in deficit
increase in s*of increase in production and real income decline in the home country. Therefore,
the income, which will be spent for future consumption from the perspective of 
consumption smoothing, decreases and the current account surplus diminishes.
Next, as s
* rises, the import prices cease to rise regardless of the depreciation of the
home currency, leading to an increase in the short-run real income, although the rate
of increase in domestic production declines. So the domestic households try to save
for future consumption. However, since the foreign real interest rate does not 
fall by as much as the home real interest rate, the foreign households are not eager 
to borrow funds from the home country, and increase their short-run consumption.
As a result, even with a rise in s
*, the home current account surplus lessens. 
The current account surplus leads to an increase in consumption and a decrease in
production in the long run.
21 However, the extent of this influence lessens with an
increase in the both countries’ PTM firm ratios, because the current account surplus
decreases. When s = s
* = 1, the monetary easing has no long-run effect whatsoever,
since the current account always balances.
V. Welfare-Based Analysis on the International Monetary 
Policy Transmission with Special Emphasis on PTM 
Because the model in this paper has a micro foundation including consumers’ utility
maximization, the effects of economic policies can be evaluated on a welfare basis.
The objective of this section is to clarify how the existence of domestic and foreign
PTM firms influences the international monetary policy transmission from the 
perspective of its effect on economic welfare.
19
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21. Specifically, the rate of changes in domestic and foreign consumption in the long run can be expressed by B
as follows: 
θ + 1     δ C ˆ
t+1 = ——– ——–B ˆ
t+1,  
2θ 1 + δ
n θ + 1    δ C ˆ *
t+1 = – ——– —— – ——–B ˆ
t+1.  
1 –n 2θ 1 + δ
These equations are derived from the domestic and foreign labor supply equation in the long run, equations
(A.5) and (A.6) in Appendix 1, and the differential between rates of changes in domestic and foreign 
consumption in the long run, equation (17). These equations imply that compared with the steady state levels,
the domestic consumption increases and the foreign consumption decreases in the long run in response to the
domestic current account surplus (the foreign current account deficit) from domestic monetary easing. 
As for the change in production in the long run, we can derive the following equations from equations (A.5)
through (A.10) in Appendix 1:
δ Y ˆ
t +1 = –—— — —B ˆ
t +1,  
2(1 +δ )  
n δ Y ˆ *
t +1 = ——– —— — —B ˆ
t +1.  
1 –n 2(1 +δ ) 
That is, compared with the initial steady state levels, the domestic production decreases and the foreign 
production increases in the long run in response to the domestic current account surplus (the foreign current
account deficit) from domestic monetary easing.A. Influence of Monetary Policy on Economic Welfare
Monetary policy has both a short-run and a long-run influence on macroeconomic
variables. For this reason, to understand the influence of monetary policy on eco-
nomic welfare, it is necessary to consider the changes in utility levels in both the
short run and the long run. Accordingly, in the following analyses the sum of (1) the
change in the utility from the initial steady state in the short run and (2) the present
discounted value of the change in the utility from the initial steady state in the long
run is used to determine the overall changes in economic welfare. 
The derivation method used for calculating economic welfare follows Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995, 1996). We assume that the utility derived from money holding is
so small that it can be ignored (χ → 0). Additionally utilizing the fact that labor
inputs equal production, and that a new steady state is attained one period after
shocks, the changes in welfare levels can be expressed as equation (33) by the changes
in consumption and production both in the short run and the long run.
θ – 1        1 θ – 1        dU =C ˆ
t – —— –Y ˆ
t + — (C ˆ
t+1 – —— –Y ˆ
t +1). (33)
θδ θ
Substituting equations (29) and (30) into equation (33) and making use of the fact
that the changes in consumption and production in the long run can be expressed by
the changes in bond holdings (see Footnote 21), the changes in home welfare can now
be shown by the domestic and foreign money supply changes as follows:
 n (1 –n) {(θ – 1)[ns + (1 –n)s
*]+s
*}[2θ + δ (θ + 1)] dU =  — + —— ————————————————— –– M ˆ
t
 θθ δ θ(θ + 1) +2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*] 
(34)
 1 – n (1 –n){(θ – 1)[ns + (1 –n)s
*] +s
*}[2θ +δ (θ + 1)]  +  —— – + —— ——————————— –—————— — M ˆ *
t. 
 θθ δ θ (θ + 1) +2θ – δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 –n)s +ns
*] 
From equation (34), we know that the coefficient of M ˆ
t is always positive and 
that the coefficient of M ˆ *
t may be positive or negative depending on the values of 
s and s
*. In other words, while domestic monetary easing always improves domestic
utility, foreign monetary easing can deteriorate domestic utility, depending on the
PTM firm ratios. 
Moreover, it follows from equation (34) that as the PTM firm ratio rises (regard-
less of whether firms are domestic or foreign), the domestic welfare improves more
from a given extent of monetary easing and diminishes (or the deterioration of
domestic welfare accelerates) from a given extent of foreign monetary easing. Table 4
summarizes this relationship. 
Let us now consider the reasons for these conclusions. In the case of domestic
monetary easing, a rise in s lowers the rate of increase in consumption in the short
run and the current account surplus (leading to a decline in the long-run rate of
increase in domestic consumption and a reduction in the long-run rate of decrease in
domestic production). However, the rate of increase in short-run production lessens
(the rate of decrease in leisure eases). The reductions in the rate of increase in 
20 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002consumption and the current account surplus do have negative impacts on welfare,
and the decline in the rate of increase in production exerts positive impacts on 
welfare. However, this negative effect is outweighed by the positive effects, and thus,
on the whole, as s rises the improvement in domestic welfare accelerates. Meanwhile,
an increase in s
* also has the negative effect of reducing the home country’s current
account surplus and the positive effect of raising the rate of increase in consumption
and reducing the rate of increase in production. However, in this case as well, the 
positive effects outweigh the negative effects. Consequently, when s
* rises, domestic
monetary easing enhances domestic welfare. 
Next, we turn to the case of foreign monetary easing. Here, an increase in 
s expands the positive effect of raising the short-run rate of increase in consumption
and reducing the current account deficit, which leads to reductions in the rate of
decrease in consumption and the rate of increase in production in the long run. But
these positive effects are outweighed by the negative effect of expansion of the rate of
increase in production (or reduction in the rate of decrease of production). Thus, an
increase in s slows the rate of growth (or accelerates the rate of decline) in home 
welfare. Meanwhile, an increase in s
* does reduce the home country’s current account
deficit, but this is outweighed by the negative effects of lowering the short-run 
consumption growth rate and increasing the production growth rate (or reducing the
rate of production decline). Thus it decreases the rate of growth in domestic welfare
(or accelerates the rate of decline in domestic welfare). 
B. PTM and the International Transmission of Domestic and Foreign 
Monetary Policy
We now examine the international transmission of domestic and foreign monetary
policies from the perspective of welfare, based on the above considerations.
First we define beggar-thy-neighbor effect policies as those that reduce the welfare
of the foreign country. Under this definition, it follows from equation (34) that 
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Table 4  PTM Effect for the Influence of Monetary Policy on the Economic Welfare
Domestic monetary easing Foreign monetary easing
Domestic utility Positive Positive or negative
(∂ dU / ∂ M ˆ
t > 0) (∂ dU / ∂ M ˆ * t > 0 or < 0)
Effect of an
Acceleration of improvement
Decline in improvement 




increase in s* (or acceleration in deterioration)
Foreign utility Positive or negative Positive
(∂ dU*/ ∂ M ˆ
t > 0 or < 0) (∂ dU*/ ∂ M ˆ * t > 0)
Effect of an Decline in improvement
Acceleration of improvement
increase in s (or acceleration in deterioration)
Effect of an Decline in improvement
Acceleration of improvement
increase in s* (or acceleration in deterioration)δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ [1 + (θ – 1)(1 –n)]             δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ s > – ————————————— —s
* + —————————. 
δ (θ
2 – 1) + 2θ (θ – 1)n δ (θ
2 – 1) + 2θ (θ – 1)n
(35)
Similarly, from the relationship between changes in domestic and foreign money
supplies and the changes in foreign utility,
22 domestic monetary policy has a beggar-
thy-neighbor effect when as s and s
* satisfy the following condition: 
δ (θ
2 – 1) + 2θ (θ – 1)(1 –n)                  δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ s > – ———————————–s
* + ——————————— —. 
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ [(θ – 1)n + 1]       δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ [(θ – 1)n + 1]   
(36)
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the domestic and foreign PTM firm
ratios and the international transmission of domestic and foreign monetary policies
from the perspective of the economic welfare on the (s, s
*) dimension. 
In this figure, when the values of s and s
* fall within region (I), the domestic and
foreign monetary policies have positive effects abroad. When the values of s and s
*
fall within region (IV), the domestic and foreign monetary policies have beggar-thy-
neighbor effects. 
However, when the values of s and s
* fall within region (II), that is, when the
home PTM firm ratio is high and the foreign PTM firm ratio is low, the domestic
monetary policy has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect while the foreign monetary policy
has a positive transmission effect on the home country. Finally, when the values of 
s and  s
* fall within region (III), in other words, when the domestic PTM firm 
ratio is low but the foreign PTM firm ratio is high, domestic monetary policy has a
positive transmission effect on the foreign country and foreign monetary policy has 
a beggar-thy-neighbor effect. This shows that the external effects of home and foreign
monetary policies can be asymmetric if s and s
* fall within region (II) or (III).
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22. Specifically, the changes in foreign utility can be expressed as follows: 
 nn {(θ – 1)[ns + (1 –n)s
*] +s}[2θ + δ (θ + 1)]  dU
* = — – ————————————————— — M ˆ
t
 θθ 2θ + δθ (θ +1 ) –  δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 – n)s +ns
*] 
 1 –nn {(θ – 1)[ns + (1 –n)s
*] +s}[2θ + δ (θ + 1)]  + —— — + ————————————————— — – M ˆ *
t . 
 θθ 2θ + δθ (θ +1 )  –  δ (θ
2 – 1)[(1 – n)s +ns
*] 
23. It can easily be verified that regions (II) and (III), where the international transmission effects of domestic and
foreign monetary policies are asymmetric, always exist. First, the s intercept of equation (35) and the s
* intercept
of equation (36) can be expressed respectively as follows:
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ s
* = ————————————— — ,    
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ [(θ – 1)(1 –n) + 1] 
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ s = ——————————— — .    
δθ (θ + 1) + 2θ [(θ – 1)n + 1] 
Since θ > 1, these intercepts are less than one. Additionally, equations (35) and (36) are both downward sloping
to the right, and the slope of equation (35) is more acute than that of equation (36). Consequently, it follows
that regions (II) and (III) always exist.The origin included in region (I) corresponds to the case of s = s
* = 0 which
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) assume. The positive international monetary 
policy transmission in region (I) is consistent with the conclusions reached in
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996). Moreover, the case of domestic and foreign firms’
symmetric price-setting behaviors, which Betts and Devereux (2000) consider, corre-
sponds to the 45-degree line in Figure 1. The negative international transmission in
region (IV) is consistent with the conclusions reached in Betts and Devereux (2000)
that monetary policy can have a beggar-thy-neighbor effect when the PTM firm
ratios are sufficiently high. The new findings of this paper are that the external effects
of domestic and foreign monetary policies can be asymmetric when s and s
* are in
region (II) or (III). 
The intuitive reasons why the international monetary policy transmission can 
be asymmetric when the price-setting behaviors of domestic and foreign firms are
asymmetric may be summarized as follows.
First, in region (II), because the domestic PTM firm ratio is high while the 
foreign PTM firm ratio is low, domestic monetary easing increases production in 
the short run and causes a current account deficit in the foreign country. Similarly,
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Figure 1  PTM and the International Transmission of Domestic and Foreign 
Monetary Policy
0 (the case of O-R)
Equation (35)
Equation (36)
Domestic monetary policy has 
a beggar-thy-neighbor effect
Foreign monetary policy has a 
beggar-thy-neighbor effect








Region I:  Both domestic and foreign monetary policy increase the other country’s utility.
Region II:  Domestic monetary policy diminishes the foreign country’s utility, but foreign
monetary policy increases domestic utility (asymmetric monetary policy effect).
Region III: Domestic monetary policy increases the foreign country’s utility, but foreign 
monetary policy diminishes domestic utility (asymmetric monetary policy effect).
Region IV: Both domestic and foreign monetary policy decrease the other country’s utility.foreign monetary easing enhances production in the short run and leads to a current
account deficit in the home country. However, as is clear from the considerations
thus far, when the domestic PTM firm ratio is high, the domestic monetary easing
results in a deceleration in foreign consumption growth, and foreign monetary easing
results in an acceleration in domestic consumption growth. This shows the reason
why the positive effect of domestic monetary easing on foreign welfare is smaller than
that of foreign monetary easing on domestic welfare. 
To sum up these effects, it can be concluded that in region (II) domestic mone-
tary policy has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect, while foreign monetary policy improves
domestic welfare because of its asymmetric effects on consumption. 
Note that the external effects of monetary policies are asymmetric so long as the
domestic PTM firm ratio stays within a certain range. The case where the foreign
PTM firm ratio is low and the domestic PTM firms ratio is extremely high corre-
sponds to region (IV). In region (IV), both domestic and foreign monetary policies
have beggar-thy-neighbor effects. 
Behind the transmission effect of monetary policy in region (IV) lies the following
mechanism. As the domestic PTM firm ratio rises, foreign monetary easing acceler-
ates the growth of home production. That is, in region (IV) the positive effect of 
foreign monetary easing (an increase in domestic consumption) is outweighed by
its negative effect (an increase in domestic production), so foreign monetary policy
reduces the domestic utility level. Thus, in this region both domestic and foreign
monetary policies have beggar-thy-neighbor effects. 
VI. Implications for Japanese Monetary Policy
According to the empirical findings of Knetter (1993) and others, Japanese firms
absorb approximately half of all foreign exchange rate changes by changing their
markup ratios, while U.S. firms almost all set their export prices based on PCP. 
This section begins by setting the model parameters to numerically analyze the
influence of Japanese and U.S. monetary policies on consumption, production, and
the current account balances based on former empirical results. The international
transmission of Japanese and U.S. monetary policies is then examined from an 
economic welfare perspective, and some considerations are given to the optimal
implementation of monetary policy from an international perspective.
A. Setting of Parameter Values
To begin with, we posit Japan as the home country, the United States as the foreign
country, and adopt the values s = 0.5 and s
* = 0 based on the prior research. From 
the Japanese and U.S. nominal GDP in 2000, we set the economic scale (n) of the
home country (Japan) at 0.3, and the real interest rate at 4 percent (this corresponds
to β = 0.96 on an annual basis).
24 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002The elasticity of substitution (θ ) is also an important variable, and its value 
significantly changes the simulation results.
24 In the prior research, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic goods and foreign goods is often set at 1–2,
25 and the
elasticity of substitution among domestic goods is frequently set at a high level of
around 11 (for example, by Betts and Devereux [1999]).
In this paper, however, we assume the same elasticity of substitution among all
goods, regardless of the distinction between domestic goods and foreign goods, and
thus we set the range of the value of θ based on the estimated actual markup ratios.
26
For example, Betts and Devereux (1996) set the elasticity of substitution at 6 based
on the assertion made by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) that the U.S. markup
ratio is 1.2. Among research on the markup ratio in Japan, Baba (1995) shows that
the elasticity of substitution for the Japanese manufacturing industry is around 1.3.
This implies that the elasticity of substitution is around 4–5. Therefore, this paper
adopts a figure of 4–6 for the elasticity of substitution. 
B. International Transmission of Japanese and U.S. Monetary Policies and
Implications for the Implementation of Monetary Policy
1. International transmission of Japanese and U.S. monetary policies: 
The effects on consumption, production, and the current account balances
Based on the above parameter values, we now move on to numerical analyses on 
the international transmission of Japanese and U.S. monetary policies, and in 
particular, on the effects on macroeconomic variables. These analyses adopt the
assumption taken by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) that all firms are PCP firms
as the benchmark case.
Table 5 examines the influence of Japanese and U.S. monetary policies on 
consumption. The effect of Japanese monetary easing on the U.S. consumption is
approximately half of that under the benchmark case where all the Japanese and U.S.
firms are PCP firms. Thus, the world demand creation effect falls to about two-thirds
of that under the benchmark case. Conversely, U.S. monetary easing works to increase
U.S. and Japanese consumption growth rates because of the existence of Japanese PTM
firms, and thus its world demand creation effect is amplified.
Next, turning to the influence on production in Table 6, both Japanese and U.S.
monetary easing increase domestic production but decrease production in the other
country. The positive and negative effects are significantly diminished compared with
the benchmark case, since the Japanese PTM firm ratio is high. 
25
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24. Under given PTM firm ratio and country scale figures, changes in the value of elasticity of substitution change
the intercepts and slopes of equations (35) and (36) in Figure 1. For example, as the elasticity of substitution
approaches one, both equations move away from the origin. Therefore the area of region (I) expands, and
Japanese monetary policy improves the welfare of the United States with high probability. As the elasticity 
of substitution becomes larger, both equations approach the origin, and the area where monetary policy has a
beggar-thy-neighbor effect expands. Since this paper examines the case of s
* = 0, the sizes of the s-intercepts of
equations (35) and (36) are related to whether or not monetary policy has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect. 
25. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998) state that almost all of the reliable research papers adopt a figure of 1–2 for
the U.S. elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
26. Markup ratios can be expressed as θ /(θ – 1) in terms of the elasticity of substitution.Finally, as for the influence on the current account balances, which is examined 
in Table 7, monetary easing in either country causes a (per capita) current account
surplus in the country and a (per capita) current account deficit in the other.
However, the extent of this influence is greatly diminished in comparison with the
benchmark case. 
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Table 5  Influence of Japanese and U.S. Monetary Easing on Consumption: 
Effect of 1 Percent Increase in Money Supply
Percentage change from the initial steady state
Elasticity of substitution θ = 4 θ = 5 θ = 6
Japanese monetary easing
Effect on Japan 0.332 0.340 0.348
(0.348) (0.360) (0.372)
Effect on the  0.143 0.141 0.140
United States (0.280) (0.274) (0.269)
Global total effect 0.200 0.201 0.202
(0.300) (0.300) (0.300)
U.S. monetary easing
Effect on Japan 0.668 0.660 0.652
(0.652) (0.640) (0.628)
Effect on the  0.857 0.859 0.860
United States (0.720) (0.726) (0.731)
Global total effect 0.800 0.799 0.798
(0.700) (0.700) (0.700)
Note: Figures in parentheses show the transmission effect under the benchmark case where all
Japanese and U.S. firms are PCP firms.
Table 6  Influence of Japanese and U.S. Monetary Easing on Production: 
Effect of 1 Percent Increase in Money Supply
Percentage change from the initial steady state
Elasticity of substitution θ = 4 θ = 5 θ = 6
Japanese monetary easing
Effect on Japan 1.937 2.345 2.744
(2.909) (3.500) (4.070)
Effect on the  –0.545 –0.718 –0.887
United States (–0.818) (–1.071) (–1.316)
Global total effect 0.200 0.201 0.202
(0.300) (0.300) (0.300)
U.S. monetary easing
Effect on Japan –0.937 –1.345 –1.744
(–1.909) (–2.500) (–3.070)
Effect on the  1.545 1.718 1.887
United States (1.818) (2.071) (2.316)
Global total effect 0.800 0.799 0.798
(0.700) (0.700) (0.700)
Note: Figures in parentheses show the transmission effect under the benchmark case where all
Japanese and U.S. firms are PCP firms.2. International transmission of Japanese and U.S. monetary policies: 
The effects on economic welfare
We now turn to the effect of Japanese and U.S. monetary policy in terms of 
economic welfare (Table 8). Compared with the benchmark case, monetary easing in
either country works to increase that country’s utility, but simultaneously lessens the
improvement in utility, or even diminishes the utility, in the other country. It follows
from the simulation result in Table 8 that U.S. monetary easing increases Japanese
utility, while the effect of Japanese monetary easing on U.S. utility is so small that it
can be neglected. Additionally, under Japanese monetary easing when the elasticity of
substitution (θ ) is assumed to be 5 or 6, U.S. economic welfare actually worsens
slightly.
27 The reason for this result can be explained as follows, using Figure 1.
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Table 7  Influence of Japanese and U.S. Monetary Easing on the Current Account
Balance: Effect of 1 Percent Increase in Money Supply
Percentage change from the initial steady state
Elasticity of substitution θ = 4 θ = 5 θ = 6
Japanese monetary easing
Effect on Japan 1.271 1.675 2.070
(1.909) (2.500) (3.070)
Effect on the  –0.545 –0.718 –0.887
United States (–0.818) (–1.071) (–1.316)
U.S. monetary easing
Effect on Japan –1.271 –1.675 –2.070
(–1.909) (–2.500) (–3.070)
Effect on the  0.545 0.718 0.887
United States (0.818) (1.071) (1.316)
Note: Figures in parentheses show the transmission effect under the benchmark case where all
Japanese and U.S. firms are PCP firms.
Table 8  Influence of Japanese and U.S. Monetary Easing on the Economic Welfare:
Effect of 1 Percent Increase in Money Supply
Percentage change from the initial steady state
Elasticity of substitution θ = 4 θ = 5 θ = 6
Japanese monetary easing
Effect on Japan 0.150 0.139 0.131
(0.075) (0.060) (0.050)
Effect on the  0.007 –0.002 –0.008
United States (0.075) (0.060) (0.050)
U.S. monetary easing
Effect on Japan 0.100 0.061 0.035
(0.175) (0.140) (0.117)
Effect on the  0.243 0.202 0.175
United States (0.175) (0.140) (0.117)
Note: Figures in parentheses show the transmission effect under the benchmark case where all
Japanese and U.S. firms are PCP firms.
27. Although there is a large current account imbalance between United States and Japan in the real world, this 
simulation estimates the changes in economic welfare from unexpected monetary easing in the steady state where
the current account balances are zero.When the Japanese PTM firm ratio is 0.5 and the U.S. PTM firm ratio is 0, the
relationship between s = 0.5 on the vertical axis and the s-intercepts of equations (35)
and (36) represents regions (I), (II), or (IV), to which the simulation results of 
the cases θ = 4, 5, and 6 correspond. Therefore, we can judge whether monetary
policies in both countries have beggar-thy-neighbor effects or not by comparing the
s-intercepts of both equations and s = 0.5. 
First, when the real interest rate is 4 percent, the value of the s-intercept of 
equation (36), which is the boundary between regions (I) and (II), is less than 0.5 if
the elasticity of substitution is more than 4.72. In this case, Japanese monetary 
policy has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect. Therefore, we can confirm θ = 4 results in a
different conclusion from the case where θ is more than 5 in terms of whether or not
Japanese monetary policy has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect.
Next, when the real interest rate is 4 percent, the s-intercept of equation (35),
which is the border between regions (II) and (IV), is less than 0.5 if the elasticity 
of substitution is more than 8.37. When s = 0.5, both Japanese and U.S. monetary
policies have beggar-thy-neighbor effects as long as the elasticity of substitution is
more than 8.37. Therefore, if we assume that the elasticity of substitution is 11 as 
in Betts and Devereux (1999), both Japanese and U.S. monetary policies have
beggar-thy-neighbor effects even if we incorporate the asymmetry of s and s
*. 
3. Implications for the implementation of monetary policy
Based on these simulation results, how should monetary policy then be conducted
from an international perspective?
First of all, if we assume that the elasticity of substitution (θ ) is 4–6, Japanese and
U.S. monetary policies do not simultaneously have beggar-thy-neighbor effects.
Suppose that the value of θ is within the range of 5–6 and that Japanese monetary
easing exerts a small negative influence on the U.S. through the depreciation of 
yen as shown in Table 8. Then, even if the U.S. implements monetary easing to 
offset this negative impact, this policy change does not have a negative effect on
Japan according to Table 8. Therefore, competitive devaluation through a chain of
easy monetary policies, in the sense that Japan conducts more monetary easing
responding to U.S. policy changes, cannot occur within the range of monetary easing
which is valid under the log-linearization approach among the steady states adopted
in this paper.
Second, based on the relatively high Japanese PTM firm ratio, Japanese monetary
policy has a miniscule effect on U.S. demand creation, and its effect on U.S. utility 
is nearly zero, so its international transmission is extremely small. For example,
according to Table 5, the effect of Japanese monetary policy on world demand is
three-sevenths of the effect of U.S. monetary policy (this is equal to the ratio of 
the two nations’ economic scales) when all the Japanese and U.S. firms are PCP
firms. However, Japanese monetary policy has only one-quarter of the effect of U.S.
monetary policy when half of the Japanese firms are PTM firms. This means that
Japan should consider that the international transmission of Japanese monetary 
policy is small in its conduct of monetary policy.
Third, the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy is bigger than 
that of Japanese monetary policy since the U.S. PTM firm ratio is relatively low.
28 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002Because of this, other conditions being constant, U.S. monetary policy should 
hopefully give a greater emphasis to the international perspective compared with
Japanese monetary policy.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we incorporated asymmetrical price-setting behavior between the home 
country and the foreign country into the “new open-economy macroeconomics”
framework proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996), and then examined how
this affects the international monetary policy transmission. 
The findings of this paper can be summarized as follows:
(1) We show that the exchange rate does not overshoot but rather jumps to 
its long-run equilibrium level immediately after the implementation of
monetary policy. However, this result depends on the structure of the 
utility function.
(2) We confirm that a rise in the percentage of PTM firms magnifies the response
of the exchange rate to monetary policy, consistent with Betts and Devereux
(2000). Moreover, the exchange rate volatility is dependent on the percentages
of domestic and foreign PTM firms together with the sizes of the domestic
and foreign economies. For example, the exchange rates between large and
small countries become more volatile in proportion with the percentage of
PTM firms in the small country. This finding indicates that the exchange rate
volatility between large and small countries is high when firms in the small
country use the currency of the large country as their invoice currency, as long
as a floating exchange rate regime is in place. It may apply to the exchange rate
fluctuation characteristics between the U.S. and Asian economies or between
the European Union and East European countries.
(3) The international transmission of domestic and foreign monetary policies
depend on firms’ price-setting behavior. Consequently, the external effects 
of domestic and foreign monetary policies can be asymmetric when domestic
and foreign firms’ price-setting behaviors are different. For example, if the
ratio of PTM firms in the home country is high and that in the foreign 
country is low, domestic monetary policy may have a beggar-thy-neighbor
effect in the sense that it deteriorates the welfare of the foreign country. 
On the other hand, foreign monetary policy can enhance the welfare of the
home country. 
(4) The simulation analysis based on Japanese and U.S. data shows that the differ-
ence between Japan and U.S. firms’ price-setting behavior results in a weak
effect of Japanese monetary policy on the U.S. economy and a strong effect of
U.S. monetary policy on the Japanese economy. The following mechanism
provides the background to this result. Even if the yen/U.S. dollar exchange
rate fluctuates due to changes in Japanese monetary policy, Japanese firms 
pass only a portion of the exchange rate fluctuation on to their export prices
to the United States. Thus the change in U.S. import prices is limited and
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Conversely, U.S. firms’ export prices change by as much as the exchange rate
fluctuations, hence the Japanese economy is more strongly affected by the
U.S. monetary policy. 
These simulation results illustrate that we should not overvalue the external
effect of Japanese monetary policy if the current percentage of Japanese PTM
firms remains reasonably stable. 
30 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2002APPENDIX 1: THE LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES AND
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES
Appendix 1 explains the long-run equilibrium conditions and the derivations of
equations (16) and (17). The equilibrium conditions at period t + 1 can be expressed
by the following 11 equations: 
(Euler equation)
Ct+2 =β (1 +rt+2)Ct+1, (A.1)
C
*




t+1,   (A.2)
(Money demand function)
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Among these, equations (A.1)–(A.6) are directly derived from the first-order 
conditions for households, equations (8)–(10).
Equations (A.7) and (A.8) show that the nominal bond holdings are determined
by the difference between the sum of nominal bond holdings in the previous period
and the income derived from production and consumption expenditures. 
Equations (A.9) and (A.10) are derived from the aggregation of the demand for the
good j across all agents. Note that since prices are flexible at period t +1, the prices set
by PTM firms and PCP firms are identical. Thus, the market clearing conditions 
for PTM and PCP firms are the same, PPP always holds, and the domestic and foreign
real interest rates are equalized. 
Finally, as for the derivations of equations (16) and (17), equation (16) is
obtained by converting equations (A.1) and (A.2) to log-linear expressions, and 
utilizing the fact that PPP is maintained from period t + 1. Equation (17) is derived
by log-linearizing equations (A.3)–(A.10), and then deleting the terms yt+1, y
*
t+1, and
et+1 from them, using the fact that Bt+1 equals Bt+2.
APPENDIX 2: SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
The short-run equilibrium conditions can be expressed by the following 13 equations:
(Euler equation)
Ct+1 = β (1 +rt+1)Ct, (A.12)
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(Market clearing condition for PTM goods)
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(Uncovered interest rate parity)
et+1 (1 + it+1) = — —(1 + i
*
t+1). (A.24) et
These 13 equations contain 12 unknown variables (Ct, C
*
t , it+1, i
*








28 However, from Walras’ Law one of these equations is not
independent, so the number of equations and the number of unknown variables
becomes equal, showing that these equations do express the equilibrium at period t.
In addition, the difference between these equations and the long-run equilibrium
conditions in the previous appendix is as follows. Since prices are assumed to be 
rigid in the short run, the prices set by PCP and PTM firms are not identical. Thus,
equations (A.9) and (A.10) have to be substituted by equations (A.18) through
(A.23). Additionally, the labor supply equation does not hold in the short run.
Although equation (A.24) holds even in the short run because of bond transactions
in the international bond market, PPP does not hold due to the existence of PTM
firms, so equation (A.11) is excluded from the equilibrium conditions. Moreover,
because the general price levels in both countries do not change symmetrically, the
domestic and foreign real interest rates are not equalized. 
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28. Assuming that the terms Ct+1, C
*
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